By Alpha Ngunyale, Executive Secretary at Tanzania Commercial Poultry Association
Kenya’s maize policies are have undergone significant changes recently, especially concerning yellow maize (typically used for animal feed) and genetically modified (GMO) maize. These policies cover import rules, trade incentives, legal frameworks, and strategic plans. Below is a structured analysis of Kenya’s stance and plans, and how these may affect regional trade and Tanzania’s poultry and animal feed sectors.
Import Policies for Yellow Maize and GMO Maize
Yellow Maize Imports: Traditionally, Kenya’s staple is white maize for human consumption, with yellow maize used mainly in animal feeds. To protect consumers and ease pressure on white maize supplies, Kenya has periodically opened import quotas for yellow maize during shortages. In early 2025, the government announced it would allow 5.5 million bags of yellow maize to be imported with a 50% import duty waiver, specifically for animal feed use (1) (2).
This policy (pending gazettement as of April 2025) aims to reduce competition between livestock feed manufacturers and human food millers over the scarce white maize stocks.
A key condition is that the imported yellow maize must be non-GMO and used strictly in feed production . By channeling feed millers toward non-GMO yellow maize, the government hopes to free up white maize for human consumption and curb the skyrocketing price of unga (maize flour) Past import programs reflect similar strategies: for example, in 2019 and 2023, Kenya temporarily waived duties to import set quantities of maize (including yellow maize for feed) when domestic harvests faltered (3). However, utilization of these quotas has sometimes been low due to sourcing challenges for non-GMO maize.
President William Ruto’s administration has also shown a protectionist streak – in October 2023, Ruto ordered that no new import permits for maize (or wheat) be issued unless domestic supply proved insufficient. This underscores Kenya’s policy of import restrictions during good harvests, with relief measures (like duty waivers) kicking in only during acute shortages to stabilize the market.
GMO Maize Imports: Kenya’s policy on GMO maize has been in flux. A decade-long ban on GMO crop importation and cultivation (in place since 2012) was lifted in October 2022, as the new government sought to address food security and high food costs (4) (5). Initially, this opening raised the possibility of importing GMO maize to bridge deficits. However, the ban reversal was met with legal challenges that temporarily reinstated restrictions. In early 2023, a court injunction halted the government’s decision, effectively barring GMO imports while the case was litigated.
This injunction meant that through 2023, Kenya could only import maize that was certified non-GMO – a major limitation since an estimated 75% of global exportable maize is from GMO-adopting countries. Indeed, a government plan in 2023 to allow 900,000 MT of duty-free white maize largely failed because suppliers of non-GE (genetically engineered) grain were limited. By late 2024, the legal tide turned: the High Court dismissed the pending petitions and upheld the lifting of the GMO ban, noting that Kenya has a robust biosafety framework to ensure safe use of GM crops. This court decision essentially cleared the way for importing and cultivating GMO maize under regulated conditions (6).
In principle, Kenya is now open to GMO maize imports, provided they meet approval and labeling requirements of the National Biosafety Authority (NBA) (7). However, policy statements in early 2025 suggest a cautious approach: Agriculture Cabinet Secretary Mutahi Kagwe indicated he would ban certain GMO maize imports despite the court’s green light, preferring locally developed GMO varieties over foreign ones (8). This reflects lingering political and public sensitivity around GMO food.
In practice, Kenya’s 2025 yellow maize import program specifically mandated “non-GMO” shipments, showing the government is still exercising caution on transgenic maize in the food/feed supply, even as the legal ban has been lifted.
Trade Regulations and Incentives
Tariffs and Import Duties: Kenya is a member of the East African Community (EAC) and applies the EAC Common External Tariff. Maize imports from outside the EAC normally face a steep 50% ad valorem duty, while imports from EAC partner states (e.g. Tanzania, Uganda) enter duty-free. This high external tariff is meant to protect East African maize farmers from cheap global grain. In times of deficit, however, Kenya has resorted to duty waivers or reductions as a temporary relief measure. For instance, the 5.5 million bag yellow maize program comes with a 50% duty waiver (halving the usual tariff) to make imports affordable.
Similarly, in 2023, the government opened short “tariff-free windows” for importing maize (both white and yellow) from outside the EAC to counter soaring prices. Those imports were restricted to specific uses (e.g. yellow maize only for feed) and timeframes, illustrating Kenya’s use of quota-based duty exemptions rather than full liberalisation. It’s worth noting that even when duties are waived, other regulatory conditions apply – for example, Kenya requires importers to be vetted, and the end-use of yellow maize is monitored to prevent it from entering the food market.
Trade Agreements and Sources: Within the EAC, Kenya can source maize regionally without tariffs, and historically, Tanzania has been the dominant supplier of Kenya’s imported maize. For example, in the 2021/22 marketing year, 97% of Kenya’s maize imports (over 700,000 tons) came from Tanzania.
However, relying on regional trade has its risks: Tanzania and other neighbours often restrict exports during their shortages, cutting off Kenya’s supply. Indeed, the Government of Tanzania has at times imposed export bans or tough permit requirements when domestic stocks are low. This has forced Kenyan traders to seek “non-traditional” sources like Zambia or even South Africa. (South Africa’s maize, being largely GMO, became accessible only after Kenya signaled openness to GMOs – small quantities were imported in 2022/23.
Kenya is also exploring import deals beyond Africa; previously, Mexico was identified as a non-GMO maize source when regional supplies failed (9). No specific new trade agreements have been announced for maize, but Kenya’s commitment to regional free trade is tempered by these food security concerns.
In terms of incentives, the Kenyan government has emphasized subsidies on farm inputs rather than import subsidies. A major ongoing incentive is the subsidized fertilizer program, which in 2023–2024 provided fertilizer to maize farmers at roughly half price, spurring a notable expansion in maize acreage and output (10). The policy goal is to boost local production (and thereby reduce import needs) by making farming more affordable.
This seems to be yielding fruit – official statements in late 2024 boasted of a maize surplus and proclaimed that no maize imports would be needed in 2025 due to “impressive local production” gains. While this zero-import claim was optimistic, it underscores Kenya’s strategic use of input subsidies and import tariffs to attain self-sufficiency.
Government Strategies and Outlook to ensure food and feed safety.
The Kenyan government’s strategic intent is to achieve maize self-sufficiency and lower food/feed costs by the latter part of this decade. President William Ruto has been an outspoken supporter of biotechnology and has framed GMO adoption as key to solving Kenya’s recurrent food shortages. His administration lifted the GMO ban with the explicit goal of improving crop yields and reducing the high cost of food and animal feed . By enabling drought-tolerant and pest-resistant GM maize varieties, the government hopes to stabilize maize production against climate shocks (like the droughts that hurt output in 2021–2022 and reduce the need for imports by 2025 and beyond.
Several strategic moves support this outlook:
Boosting Domestic Production: The continuation of subsidized fertilizer programs, expansion of irrigated farming (such as reviving the Galana-Kulalu irrigation project), and promotion of modern farming techniques all aim to increase maize yields. Kenya’s yields have historically been low (averaging ~1.6–2.0 MT/ha), and officials cite the potential to double yields by adopting better seeds and agronomy (11) . A shift to yellow maize cultivation is being encouraged to supply at least 1 million tons annually to feed mills. If a significant number of Kenyan farmers switch some acreage to yellow maize by 2026, the poultry and livestock industries could rely on home-grown feedstock, reducing import dependency. Kagwe has explicitly urged farmers to consider this shift, portraying it as both an economic opportunity and a patriotic contribution to food security.
GMO Integration: Assuming legal challenges are resolved, the period 2025–2027 could see commercial planting of Bt maize by institutions like KALRO (Kenya’s agri-research agency) and distribution to farmers . The government’s strategy is to roll out locally adapted GMO maize varieties (for example, those that resist fall armyworm and stem borers) to quickly boost production on existing maize lands. By 2027, Kenya could potentially have a few growing seasons of GMO maize under its belt, which—if successful—would improve national output and possibly moderate grain prices. However, officials like CS Kagwe want to ensure these are Kenya-tailored solutions, likely to avoid dependence on foreign seed companies. This suggests a strategy of technological self-reliance, meaning Kenya might prefer public sector or African-developed GM varieties.
Market Interventions: The government is also prepared to intervene in the market to protect consumers. For example, releasing stocks from the National Strategic Reserve to flour millers was mentioned as a tool to check maize flour prices. Additionally, in the event of acute shortages, Kenya has kept the option to temporarily allow imports (duty-free or reduced duty) from outside, as seen in 2023–2025. So while the strategy is to minimize imports, the policy outlook through 2027 is flexible: Kenya will deviate from the no-import stance if local production falters . This flexibility extends to sourcing from the international market, including potentially from GMO-producing countries, should a crisis loom. A 2025 opinion by a former industry executive highlights that if regional supplies (notably from Tanzania) dwindle before Kenya’s next harvest, the country must be ready to pivot, possibly by embracing GMO imports that it once shunned. In essence, Kenya’s strategic outlook is to hope for self-sufficiency but prepare for contingency.
Regional Positioning: Kenya’s policies are also shaped by its role in regional trade. Officially, Kenya supports the EAC goal of free movement of goods, but in practice it is positioning itself to be less vulnerable to neighbors for staple grains. By increasing its own output and accepting GMO innovations (ahead of most of its neighbors), Kenya could become more independent in feed and food supply by 2027. There is even an implicit ambition that Kenya might move from chronic importer to a stable market or even occasional exporter in good years. Reducing reliance on Tanzania, Uganda, or Zambia for maize is seen as strategic, given past supply disruptions. This stance might also allow Kenya to leverage its policies in regional forums – for instance, advocating for a harmonized approach to GMOs in the EAC, now that Kenya is an early adopter. However, such divergence (Kenya allowing GMO, while neighbors have bans or hesitations) could also create trade frictions, which Kenya will have to navigate diplomatically in the coming years.
Implications for Tanzania’s Poultry and Animal Feed Sectors
Kenya’s evolving maize policies have significant spillover effects for Tanzania, especially in the poultry and feed industry:
Regional Maize Trade and Price Effects: Tanzania is a major maize surplus producer and has traditionally filled Kenya’s supply gaps. If Kenya succeeds in its self-sufficiency drive (through higher local production or GMO adoption), it could reduce demand for Tanzanian maize exports over 2024–2027. A diminished Kenyan import demand might lead to excess supply in Tanzania, putting downward pressure on maize prices regionally. For Tanzanian feed manufacturers and poultry farmers, cheaper local maize could be a boon – it lowers the cost of animal feed, potentially improving profit margins for egg and broiler producers. However, for Tanzanian maize farmers, it could mean fewer high-paying export opportunities. In the immediate term, Kenya’s 2025 import policy (favoring overseas non-GMO yellow maize with duty waivers) suggests that Kenyan buyers might import grain from outside Africa rather than from Tanzania, especially if Tanzania’s own export restrictions persist (). This could deprive Tanzanian traders of the Kenyan market, at least temporarily. Tanzania often protects its maize in poor harvest years, as seen with its export permit system (), but during good harvests it has relied on selling to Kenya. If Kenya’s policy increasingly sources from abroad or uses substitutes, Tanzanian maize may need to find other markets or be used domestically.
Feed Cost Competitiveness: With Kenya explicitly targeting a reduction in animal feed costs (through subsidized imports of yellow maize and potentially GMO grain in the future), Kenyan poultry producers may enjoy significantly lower feed prices than their Tanzanian counterparts. Feed (particularly maize) constitutes a large portion of poultry production costs. Should Kenya manage to import or produce feed-grade maize more cheaply, Kenyan poultry and egg producers could gain a competitive edge. This could manifest in two ways: Kenyan producers might better supply their domestic market (reducing any need for imports of poultry products), and they might even export surplus poultry products to nearby markets. There have been past instances of cross-border competition – for example, Kenyan farmers have complained about cheaper Ugandan eggs flooding the market when feed costs differ. If Kenya’s feed initiatives succeed, the reverse could happen, with Kenya potentially able to offer poultry products at lower prices. Tanzanian poultry farmers, who currently benefit when Kenyan prices are high (by exporting informally or through regional channels), could find that avenue narrowing. In Tanzania’s own market, local poultry might face competition if cheaper Kenyan eggs or chicken meat find their way in via trade or smuggling, especially if Tanzania’s production costs remain higher. On the flip side, if Kenya’s policies were to stumble (say Kenya faces a maize shortfall despite everything, leading to very high prices), Tanzanian producers could step in to supply maize or even finished poultry products to Kenya. Overall, Kenya’s drive to contain feed costs raises the bar for Tanzania’s poultry sector to improve its efficiency or face competitive pressure.
Policy Harmonization and GMO Divide: A critical implication is the emerging policy divergence on GMOs. Kenya is now (as of 2025) legally permitting GMO maize cultivation and importation, whereas Tanzania has maintained a cautious stance on GMOs (Tanzania has no commercial GM crops and has had strict controls on GMO trials and imports). This divergence could create non-tariff barriers in regional trade. For instance, if Kenya in the future produces surplus maize (some of it GMO) or maize-based feeds, Tanzania may refuse entry to those products on biosafety grounds. Conversely, Tanzanian feed or food exports to Kenya might be preferred by GMO-wary Kenyan consumers as “GMO-free,” but Kenya’s official policy is moving towards accepting GMOs, which could lessen such distinctions. The differing regulations might call for new protocols – such as testing and certification of non-GMO status for maize traded between the two countries – adding to trade friction. Additionally, Kenya’s head start with GM maize might put political pressure on Tanzania to re-evaluate its own biotech policies by mid-decade. If Kenya demonstrates gains (higher yields, lower prices) from Bt maize by 2026–2027, Tanzanian policymakers and poultry industry stakeholders might lobby for similar access to GM feed components, or risk lagging behind. However, if public sentiment in Tanzania remains opposed, the country may double-down on non-GMO branding, which could limit regional integration of feed supply chains.
Supply Stability for Tanzania’s Feed Sector: In positive terms, Kenya’s moves could indirectly benefit Tanzania’s feed sector security. In years past, large purchases by Kenyan traders sometimes strained Tanzanian domestic supply, contributing to spikes in local maize prices (to the concern of Tanzanian feed millers and food security planners). If Kenya reduces its draw on Tanzanian maize, the volatility of feed grain supply in Tanzania might decrease, helping local feed mills plan more stable operations. Tanzanian poultry farmers might enjoy more consistent feed availability at home, instead of losing corn to exports during times of regional shortage. Furthermore, with Kenya’s feed industry focusing on yellow maize, there may be opportunities for Tanzanian producers.
In conclusion, Tanzania’s poultry and animal feed sectors should closely watch Kenya’s policy trajectory.
If Kenya successfully lowers its feed costs and secures its maize supply, Tanzanian producers may need to innovate and cut costs to remain competitive. Conversely, reduced Kenyan reliance on Tanzanian maize could mean more supply left for Tanzanian uses, potentially lowering feed prices domestically – a double-edged sword that helps poultry integrators but might hurt Tanzanian grain farmers.
